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Internal modelTwo general approaches to the visual control of action have emerged in last few decades, known as the
on-line and model-based approaches. The key difference between them is whether action is controlled by
current visual information or on the basis of an internal world model. In this paper, we evaluate three
hypotheses: strong on-line control, strong model-based control, and a hybrid solution that combines
on-line control with weak off-line strategies. We review experimental research on the control of locomo-
tion and manual actions, which indicates that (a) an internal world model is neither sufﬁcient nor nec-
essary to control action at normal levels of performance; (b) current visual information is necessary
and sufﬁcient to control action at normal levels; and (c) under certain conditions (e.g. occlusion) action
is controlled by less accurate, simple strategies such as heuristics, visual-motor mappings, or spatial
memory. We conclude that the strong model-based hypothesis is not sustainable. Action is normally con-
trolled on-line when current information is available, consistent with the strong on-line control hypoth-
esis. In exceptional circumstances, action is controlled by weak, context-speciﬁc, off-line strategies. This
hybrid solution is comprehensive, parsimonious, and able to account for a variety of tasks under a range
of visual conditions.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Locomotor and manual actions are fundamental to daily human
interactions with a complex dynamic environment. The mecha-
nisms underlying the perceptual control of action are of central
importance to our understanding of both the function of percep-
tion and the organization of action. Two general approaches to
visual control have emerged over the last few decades, often
referred to as the on-line approach and the model-based approach.
The fundamental difference between the two lies in the underlying
basis for control. In on-line control, action is guided by current
visual information that is available during the ongoing movement.
In contrast, in model-based control, action is guided by an internal
representation of the physical world and the actor. In this paper,
we review the evidence regarding on-line and model-based control
drawn from research on locomotion and manual actions, and arrive
at some conclusions about the plausibility of each approach.
A primary role for current information in the control of action
was originally emphasized by Gibson (1958, 1979). According to
Gibson, various types of information are available to specify the
properties of the environment. Detection of visual information byan attuned perceptual system enables humans to be aware of the
speciﬁed environmental properties and to control their actions
successfully with respect to those properties. As Gibson (1979)
asserted, ‘‘Locomotion and manipulation . . . are controlled not by
the brain but by information, that is, by seeing oneself in the world.
Control lies in the animal–environment system.’’ Following
Gibson’s seminal work, the role of visual information in action
control has been increasingly recognized (see Warren, 1998,
2009). A growing number of studies have identiﬁed speciﬁc optical
variables and proposed control laws that couple action to the envi-
ronment. For example, it has been shown that walking can be
steered by using the currently available optic ﬂow, which speciﬁes
one’s heading relative to a target (Bruggeman, Zosh, & Warren,
2007; Warren et al., 2001). The locomotor trajectory and even
anticipatory behavior emerges from the actor–environment sys-
tem as a consequence of lawful regularities governing the coupled
system’s behavior (Stepp & Turvey, 2010; Warren, 2006).
The concept of an internal model was introduced by Craik
(1943/1967) in his inﬂuential book, The nature of explanation. Craik
proposed that the brain ‘‘imitates’’ a physical process by creating
an ‘‘internal model of reality’’ with a similar ‘‘relation-structure,’’
thereby enabling prediction of external events in the physical
world (pp. 50–53, 81–82). In engineering, internal model control
was developed to compensate for the time delays inherent in feed-
back control by incorporating an internal model of the controlled
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Fig. 1. An outﬁelder catching a ﬂy ball.
H. Zhao, W.H. Warren / Vision Research 110 (2015) 190–202 191system (Conant & Ashby, 1970; Garcia & Morari, 1982). Similarly,
internal models of the musculoskeletal system have been pro-
moted in computational motor control (Kawato, 1999; Wolpert &
Ghahramani, 2000), while world models have been incorporated
into control architectures for mobile robots (Moravec, 1982;
Thrun, 1997). Echoing Craik, Wolpert describes internal models
as ‘‘putative neural systems that mimic physical systems outside
the brain,’’ whose ‘‘primary role is to predict the behavior of the
body and the world’’ (Davidson & Wolpert, 2005, p. S313;
Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000, p. 1212). The standard concept of
an internal model thus satisﬁes Clark and Grush’s (1999) descrip-
tion of a ‘‘full-blooded’’ representation: an inner surrogate for an
extra-neural state of affairs that can be decoupled (at least tempo-
rarily) from ongoing environmental input. Wolpert and
Ghahramani (2000) offer the analogy of predicting the future path
of a thrown ball, using a model that includes the equations of pro-
jectile motion (Newton’s laws), the ﬁxed parameters of the system
(gravitational constant, air resistance, ball diameter and mass), and
takes information about the ball’s initial state (position, velocity,
spin) as input.
Whereas the on-line approach emphasizes the perceiver’s
coupling to the environment by means of optical information, the
model-based approach emphasizes the role of an internal model of
the world, including the environment and the actor’s state. Suc-
cessful action thus typically depends on a close correspondence
between the physical world and its internal model. As an action
unfolds, the state of the actor is continuously monitored based
on sensory information and/or motor efference, and is used to
update the world model. The primary role in controlling action
– whether or not visual information is concurrently available – is
thus played by an internal representation of the external world.
There is evidence that action can be guided without concurrent
visual information in some circumstances, which we will refer to
as off-line control. For example, in the blind walking task, blind-
folded participants are able to walk successfully to a target they
have previously viewed. Loomis and Beall (1998, 2004) proposed
that visual and other sensory input is processed to construct an
internal 3D model of the environment, which they called ‘‘percep-
tual space.’’ Based on this internal model, they argued, locomotor
behavior is planned and executed and the actor’s state is updated
in relation to the model. Results from the blind walking paradigm
thus provide evidence that locomotion can be guided by some form
of spatial memory.
One problemwe face in trying to evaluate the two approaches is
that the properties of internal world models are seldom clearly
speciﬁed in the literature. Some internal models appear to have a
wide scope, such as the laws of projectile motion or a detailed
3D model of the environment. Others are said to represent speciﬁc
situations with a narrow scope, such as the extrapolated trajectory
of a given object or the spatial location of a particular target. Some-
times speciﬁc knowledge of ﬁxed parameters or constants, such as
Earth’s gravitational acceleration or a ball’s diameter or elasticity,
is also referred to as an internal model. We will reserve the term
‘‘internal model’’ for an inner surrogate that mimics an external
physical process; constants do not meet this standard, although
they can act as constraints on the calibration of optical variables
or visual-motor control laws (Gómez & López-Moliner, 2013;
Jacobs & Michaels, 2006). Further, the ﬁdelity of an internal model,
as well as its temporal duration, are rarely speciﬁed. This makes it
difﬁcult to operationalize and test the predicted accuracy, preci-
sion, and time course of model-based action. The hypothesis is thus
rather unconstrained and its predictions quite malleable, to the
point where it may be scientiﬁcally untestable (Chemero, 2009;
Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003; Hecht, 2001). We
approach this problem by trying to conceptually clarify strongand weak positions and evaluating the empirical claims for on-line
and model-based control made in the experimental literature.
Both the on-line and model-based approaches have something
to contribute to our understanding of the control of action. The
on-line approach contributes by identifying speciﬁc information
in natural environments and characterizing control laws that
map the information into movement control variables. Its advan-
tage lies in its parsimony, in reducing the computational burden
of constructing and simulating a high-ﬁdelity world model to
guide every movement. The proper domain of the on-line approach
is, by deﬁnition, action that is controlled by currently available
visual information; it does not purport to apply to off-line situa-
tions in which environmental information is unavailable, such as
blind walking. Conversely, the natural domain of the model-based
approach is action that is performed off-line without concurrent
visual information, like blind walking. The primary question at
issue is whether the model-based approach normally applies to
both domains, even in the presence of visual information that
could be used to guide action on-line. A secondary question is
whether a full-blooded internal model is necessary to account for
off-line control, or whether weaker strategies are sufﬁcient. The
advantage of a strong model-based view is that it provides a com-
mon account of visual-motor control under both conditions.
In what follows, we try to conceptually clarify and evaluate
three hypotheses regarding the control of action under both nor-
mal vision and visual occlusion conditions. To introduce the
hypotheses, consider the classic outﬁelder problem, in which a
baseball player runs to catch a ﬂy ball (Fig. 1). The ball is launched
at a given distance and ﬂies in the general direction of the ﬁelder.
First, according to the strong on-line control hypothesis (Fig. 2a),
action is normally controlled on the basis of current visual infor-
mation, without the involvement of an internal model (e.g.
Chapman, 1968; McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995). This hypothesis
implies that performance would deteriorate if vision were with-
drawn, depending on the spatio-temporal demands of the task,
but it does not aim to account for action control in the absence
of visual information. One way to test this hypothesis is to elimi-
nate the current information by visually occluding the ball, and
to measure the ﬁelder’s subsequent behavior. If performance is sig-
niﬁcantly impaired under such conditions, it would suggest that
the ﬁelder ordinarily uses current visual information to control
catching.
Another test is to manipulate the visual information about the
ball’s ﬂight and determine the control law that guides the ﬁelder’s
behavior in real time. For example, the Optical Acceleration Cancel-
lation (OAC) theory proposes that the ﬁelder moves forward or
backward so as to null the vertical acceleration of the ball’s optical
projection, and left or right to keep the ball in a constant bearing
(CB) direction (Chapman, 1968; McLeod, Reed, & Dienes, 2006;
Michaels & Oudejans, 1992). If the ball’s current vertical optical
velocity (d tana/dt in Fig. 1) is increasing, the ﬁelder should speed
up in the backward direction, whereas if d tana/dt is decreasing,
the ﬁelder should speed up in the forward direction. By keeping
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Fig. 2. The three hypotheses of action control.
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will arrive at the right place at the right time to catch the ball.
Indeed, experimental manipulation of the ball’s trajectory pro-
duces adjustments by the ﬁelder that are consistent with this on-
line control strategy (Fink, Foo, & Warren, 2009; McLeod et al.,
2008). This theory offers an illustrative example of anticipatory
behavior arising from a speciﬁc coupling between actor and envi-
ronment due to lawful regularities that govern the coupled system.
However, neither of these tests can rule out the possibility that
current information is used to update an internal world model,
which is in turn used to control action. On this hypothesis, infor-
mation does not control action directly – only indirectly, via its
effects on an internal model. Speciﬁcally, according to the strong
model-based control hypothesis (Fig. 2b), action is normally con-
trolled by an internal world model. The world model is constructed
using information about the physical environment and the actor’s
state, and is used to control action even when visual information is
available. Under conditions of visual occlusion, the world model
persists and continues to guide action. In the outﬁelder example
(Fig. 1), the ﬁelder visually perceives the ball’s initial distance
and velocity, computes the ball’s trajectory based on an internal
model of the laws of projectile motion and knowledge of ﬁxed
parameters, and predicts its landing place and time (Saxberg,
1987). Consequently, the ﬁelder should be able to catch the ball
even when it is visually occluded shortly after launch. (We note
that evidence for this particular theory is lacking: at outﬁeld dis-
tances of 30 m, absolute distance and velocity are not accurately
perceived, and even skilled baseball players cannot identify correct
trajectories or predict landing points (Shaffer & McBeath, 2005).)
A critical issue is how long an internal world model can be
expected to persist and how accurately it can control behavior after
decoupling from environmental information. If an internal model
is assumed to decay rapidly, successful action would require
continuous updating by current information. Withdrawal of
information would thus lead to increasing model error, resulting
in impaired performance – depending, of course, on the spatio-
temporal demands of the task. Positing a short-lived world model
thus renders strong model-based control indistinguishable from
strong on-line control, because both require continuous visual
input and predict degraded performance under occlusion. Hence,
a rapidly-decaying internal model is not an empirically testable
hypothesis. It is also a more complex one, for it is not clear what
a continuously-updated internal model would add to the explana-
tory account if behavior can be controlled by environmental infor-
mation directly. Finally, a rapidly-decaying internal model seems
to undermine the raison d’etre of such an internal representation:
to predict the state of the world when decoupled from environ-
mental information. This proposal thus has obvious logical weak-
nesses, so we will assume that a world model persists long
enough and is accurate enough to leave empirically measurable
traces. We hope to shed some light on this issue by reviewing stud-
ies in which the duration of visual occlusion was manipulated.
The third hypothesis combines strong on-line control with a
weak version of model-based control to account for action in theabsence of vision. According to this hybrid control hypothesis
(Fig. 2c), action is ordinarily controlled on-line by current visual
information. Under special conditions, such as when the target is
occluded, its motion is stereotyped, or available information is
inadequate, action may be guided by an alternative off-line strat-
egy. The nature of this strategy is an open question: it might be
as complex as full-blooded world model, but it is more likely a sim-
pler strategy derived from previous experience with the task, such
as a heuristic, a visual-motor mapping, or a rough spatial memory.
Such a weak off-line strategy would complement on-line control
without placing an undue computational burden on the visual-
motor system.
Consider the outﬁelder problem once again (Fig. 1). Imagine
that a strong wind is blowing from ﬁelder’s left. If the ﬁelder con-
tinuously tracks the ball, the OAC and CB theories predict adaptive
on-line control of catching. But if the ball goes out of sight while
the ﬁelder is running, action must be controlled by an off-line
strategy. For example, assume the ﬁelder has learned from previ-
ous observations that ﬂying objects tend to drift downwind. This
could support a qualitative heuristic to veer rightward if the ball
goes out of sight. Alternatively, the ﬁelder might have learned a
more speciﬁc mapping from the ball’s horizontal optical velocity
to the lateral component of running speed. Based on this mapping,
the ﬁelder could guide movement in approximately the right direc-
tion after the ball goes out of sight. Neither of these strategies guar-
antees a successful catch, and presumably on-line control would
take over again if the ball comes back into view.
Thus, according to the hybrid hypothesis, on-line control is nor-
mally used when visual information is available. If this information
is withdrawn, off-line heuristic or mapping strategies can be used,
although they are likely to yield less accurate control and less suc-
cessful action. But what distinguishes such off-line strategies from
a full-blooded internal model?Wemaintain that model-based con-
trol differs from a heuristic or mapping strategy in two important
respects. First, model-based control implies that intervening states
of the world are internally ‘‘mimicked’’ or simulated with some
degree of accuracy, such as computing intermediate positions on
the ball’s trajectory. This implies that the internally represented
intervening states can be probed experimentally. In contrast, heu-
ristics and mappings are based on relations between initial infor-
mation and later environmental states or action variables, and
thus intervening states of the world are not represented and can-
not be probed. Second, a full-blooded internal model is generative
and should transfer to new conditions within the model’s domain,
supporting accurate performance in novel situations. An internal
model of projectile motion, for example, may be expected to gen-
eralize to unfamiliar initial conditions (ball distance, speed, launch
angle) and even new tasks (catching with a butterﬂy net, moving a
marker to the landing point) after the ball is occluded. In contrast,
simple heuristic and mapping strategies are expected to be situa-
tion- and task-speciﬁc. A learned mapping between initial optical
velocity and running forward or backward would only hold over
a narrow range of launch angles, and would not transfer to catch-
ing with a net. It is difﬁcult to distinguish such off-line strategies
from a decaying internal model empirically, because they both pre-
dict degraded performance under occlusion conditions. However,
experiments could be designed to probe whether intervening
states are represented, or to test the domain of generalization to
novel conditions.
In the remainder of this article, we proceed by reviewing rele-
vant experimental studies on the visual control of locomotor and
manual actions. The ﬁrst section focuses on model-based control.
Our purpose here is to determine whether a hypothesized internal
world model is sufﬁcient for accurate and precise control of action,
or whether current visual information is necessary. These studies
typically manipulate the availability of information and analyze
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section, we review the on-line control literature, with the aim of
determining whether current information is sufﬁcient for accurate
and precise action control, and whether action is normally guided
on-line. In the third section, we consider the literature on anticipa-
tory control in interception tasks, including off-line strategies such
as heuristics and mappings. Finally, we use this evidence to
evaluate the three main hypotheses about action control and draw
preliminary conclusions.2. Model-based control: is an internal model sufﬁcient?
According to the model-based approach, action is normally con-
trolled on the basis of a 3D world model. This view implies that
such an internal representation alone should be sufﬁcient to con-
trol action in the absence of visual information, at a comparable
level of performance, for some period of time. Numerous studies
address this question by manipulating the availability of visual
information. If visual input is withdrawn and task performance
remains accurate and precise, this would imply that such an inter-
nal representation is sufﬁcient to control action. But it would not
imply that action is normally model-based when visual informa-
tion is available. Conversely, if performance deteriorates, this
would imply that concurrent visual information is necessary for
normal levels of performance. But it would be agnostic as to
whether the information is used to guide action directly or to
update a short-lived internal model. Studies manipulating the
duration of visual occlusion might shed some light on this
question.2.1. Visual occlusion leads to degraded performance
Research on visually directed action is often regarded as evidence
for model-based control in human locomotion (Loomis & Beall,
2004; Loomis & Philbeck, 2008). For example, in the typical blind
walking task, human participants brieﬂy view a target on the
ground at a distance, close their eyes, and walk without vision to
the remembered target location. This task has been extensively
investigated over the last three decades. It is usually reported that
human actors are able to perform blind walking successfully with
target distances up to 30 m (Loomis et al., 1992; Rieser et al., 1990;
Thomson, 1983). Participants are able to walk to the target location
after viewing it for only 150 ms, and even without directly ﬁxating
the target (Philbeck, 2000). Successful performance is also
observed in other directed walking tasks (Loomis et al., 1992;
Philbeck, Loomis, & Beall, 1997). For example, in ‘‘triangulation
by walking’’, participants view a target at a distance and then walk
blindfolded along an oblique path until instructed to turn and walk
to the remembered target location – which they can do with rea-
sonable accuracy (Philbeck, Loomis, & Beall, 1997). This result sug-
gests that blind walking is based on a spatial memory of the target
location in the environment and updating of the actor’s position,
not simply a perceived egocentric distance, a pre-planned action,
or a visual-motor mapping.
Studies of visually directed walking thus indicate that humans
are able to perform certain actions without guidance by concurrent
visual information. However, they do not imply that action is nor-
mally model-based when such information is available. This ques-
tion hinges on a comparison of blind walking performance with
that of sighted walking. Moreover, null results must be interpreted
cautiously, for the degree of error is likely to depend on the spatial
demands of the task. Very few studies have directly compared
walking in visual and nonvisual conditions. Thomson (1983) orig-
inally asked participants to walk to a previewed target with or
without vision. Participants walked with similar accuracy and pre-cision in both conditions for target distances of 9 m or less, but var-
iability in walked distance increased dramatically in the occlusion
condition for targets at 12 m or more. In Farrell and Thomson
(1999), participants walked to a target line and placed the toe of
a speciﬁed foot against the line. Variability in ﬁnal toe position
was signiﬁcantly greater in the occlusion condition than that in
the normal vision condition. One might expect larger differences
for tasks that place greater demands on spatial memory. These
studies indicate that visual occlusion leads to degraded perfor-
mance compared with normal vision, with greater variability
implying spatial uncertainty. Therefore, spatial memory alone can-
not guide locomotion with the same precision, demonstrating an
ongoing role for current visual information.
Driving a car is an everyday activity with greater spatio-tempo-
ral demands than locomotion on foot because of higher speed and
more complex maneuvers. Initial reports indicated comparable
driving performance under full vision and visual occlusion condi-
tions when participants changed lanes on a straight road or negoti-
ated a curve (Godthelp, 1985; Godthelp, 1986). For example,
Godthelp (1985) investigated whether drivers can change lanes
without continuous visual information. Measures of steering-wheel
activity and the car’s spatial path with full vision were compared
with visual occlusion at start of the lane change. The occlusion
duration lasted 1 s in a driving simulator and 3 s in a real car. In
both cases, participants successfully performed lane changes under
both the full vision and visual occlusion conditions.
With longer occlusion durations, however, greater performance
degradation was subsequently observed (Cloete & Wallis, 2009;
Wallis, Chatziastros, & Bülthoff, 2002; Wallis et al., 2007). Wallis,
Chatziastros, and Bülthoff (2002) asked participants to perform a
lane change on a straight road in a driving simulator, under normal
light or dark-tunnel conditions. In the tunnel, all visual information
was removed and participants did not receive visual feedback
about their performance. Participants were able to change lanes
very well in normal light, but they could not successfully perform
the task in the dark-tunnel condition, and usually failed to adjust
their driving direction in the new lane. This failure persisted even
when visual feedback was provided at the end of each trial.
One possible reason for the severe performance degradation in
Wallis, Chatziastros, and Bülthoff (2002) is the extended visual
occlusion, which lasted the whole course of lane change. Even with
occlusion of 3 s, Godthelp’s (1985) participants were usually in the
midst of the lane change when visual information became avail-
able again, so they could make ﬁnal corrections to their maneuvers
in the new lane. However, in Wallis et al., visual information was
removed during the entire lane change, so participants could not
make visual corrections and were completely dependent on spatial
memory.
To analyze the inﬂuence of visual occlusion duration on driving
performance, Hildreth et al. (2000) tested a lane correction task in
a driving simulator, in which the car’s position was perturbed and
the screen went blank, and the driver tried to steer back to the cen-
ter of the lane. Errors began to accrue in the second phase of cor-
rection with visual occlusion of only 1.5 s, and variability in
steering angle and lateral position in the ﬁrst phase increased sig-
niﬁcantly at 4 s. The results indicate that even short occlusion
durations yield a decline in performance, consistent with on-line
control.
We recently investigated the effect of occlusion in a more
demanding locomotor task, walking a slalom course of ﬁve targets
(Zhao & Warren, 2013). Participants walked in a virtual environ-
ment while the visibility of the upcoming targets was manipulated
and the walking trajectory was recorded. An analysis of the passing
distance for each target revealed that increasing the number of
visible upcoming targets from 1 to 5 did not improve steering
accuracy or precision, indicating no advantage of a longer preview.
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performance signiﬁcantly deteriorated, and greater errors were
observed with occlusion of the upcoming two targets. The same
pattern of results was observed by Duchon and Warren (1997)
when participants steered a slalom course with a joystick. These
results imply that steering is normally guided to the next target
in an on-line manner, one target at a time.
So far, the ﬁndings for walking and driving appear to be consis-
tent. Withdrawal of visual information generally leads to a decline
in performance, although the effect of occlusion duration depends
on the spatio-temporal demands of the task. This emphasizes the
importance of current visual information for accurate and precise
performance, consistent with on-line control. It also provides evi-
dence of off-line control strategies that can be used in the absence
of current information, based on spatial memory that decays rap-
idly over a few seconds. The outstanding question is the role of this
current information: whether it normally controls action on-line, or
is used to update an internal model that continually controls action.
The research on manual actions such as reaching or catching is
consistent with the ﬁndings for locomotion. Manual actions differ
from locomotor actions with respect to both effectors and
spatial–temporal scale, and often demand higher accuracy and/or
precision for successful performance. In early studies on catching,
Whiting and colleagues (Sharp & Whiting, 1974; Whiting &
Sharp, 1974) found that participants were able to perform a one-
handed catching task successfully when the ball was visually
occluded for a short duration (less than 280 ms) before intercep-
tion. But longer occlusion durations led to signiﬁcantly degraded
performance.
Westwood, Heath, and Roy (2001) asked participants to reach to
a target in the midsagittal plane. The target was either fully visible,
or was occluded 0–2 s before the reaching signal and remained
occluded during the reach. Visual occlusion during the reach
resulted in greater endpoint errors, with longer occlusion times
producing even greater errors. Similar effects of occlusion duration
have been reported in other studies of manual reaching (Elliott &
Calvert, 1990; Heath, Westwood, & Binsted, 2004).
Binsted, Rolheiser, and Chua (2006) examined the time course
of the decay of the remembered location of a target. Participants
were asked to repeatedly tap between two targets presented in
the transverse plane. Both targets were illuminated for the ﬁrst
5 s, and then disappeared for the remaining 6 s of a trial. Tapping
was highly accurate when the targets were visible, but endpoint
variability signiﬁcantly increased immediately after they disap-
peared, and continued to increase through the occlusion period.
This result is consistent with on-line control when visual informa-
tion is available, and off-line control that decays rapidly after infor-
mation is withdrawn.
Related studies have investigated the effect of intermittent
vision on catching and reaching. In general, performance degrades
signiﬁcantly when the gap between visual samples is more than
80 ms (Bennett, Ashford, & Elliott, 2003; Bennett et al., 2003;
Elliott, Chua, & Pollock, 1994; Elliott et al., 1995; Lyons, Fontaine,
& Elliott, 1997). For example, Bennett, Ashford, and Elliott (2003)
and Bennett et al. (2003) asked participants to catch an approach-
ing tennis ball with visual samples of 20 ms separated by visual
occlusion intervals of 0, 20, 40 or 80 ms. Catching performance
with simultaneous binocular samples was unaffected by occlusion
intervals of 0–40 ms, but performance deteriorated signiﬁcantly
with gaps of 80 ms, with both greater position error and a higher
rate of failure. Thus, while continuous visual information may
not be necessary for successful action, relatively short occlusion
intervals signiﬁcantly impair performance. This is quite consistent
with on-line control, but would imply that any internal model of
the ball’s trajectory is extremely short-lived, raising doubts about
strong model-based control.An apparent exception is a study of catching by López-Moliner
et al. (2010), in which balls were repeatedly tossed from a distance
of 75 cm, with a mean ﬂight time of 483 ms, and randomly
occluded for 250 ms. Occlusion did not affect the ‘‘quality’’ of the
catch, as long as the ball’s motion was visible at release or
400–200 ms before the catch. The results indicate that a continu-
ous visual coupling is not necessary for this task; the ball’s launch
contained sufﬁcient information to guide catching. Nonetheless,
the authors concluded that movements are normally continuously
adjusted and that performance is a smooth function of the time
information is available. We will return to this observation in Sec-
tion 4 on anticipatory control.
In sum, walking, driving, catching, and reaching tasks are gener-
ally impaired under visual occlusion conditions. Although some
tasks can be performed successfully with short occlusion dura-
tions, it is consistently observed that longer occlusion leads to a
larger decline in accuracy and/or precision. The magnitude of error
obviously depends on the spatio-temporal demands of the task,
and the literature demonstrates that more demanding tasks can
produce signiﬁcant errors with very short occlusion periods. This
pattern of ﬁndings casts doubt on strong model-based control,
for the evidence indicates that any such representation decays
extremely rapidly upon withdrawal of visual information. At a
minimum, such an internal model would have to be continuously
updated, and hence model-based control also critically depends
on current visual information. Thus, the occlusion paradigm indi-
cates that an internal world model is by itself insufﬁcient to
account for the accuracy and precision of normal action; this level
of performance appears to require concurrent visual information.
Conversely, this observation is consistent with strong on-line con-
trol, the claim that action is normally controlled by current visual
information.
2.2. Visual occlusion leads to a different movement pattern
In the previous section, we reviewed literature on task perfor-
mance under visual occlusion conditions, leading to the conclusion
that a world model alone is not sufﬁcient to account for ordinary
levels of performance. In this section, we consider research show-
ing that the pattern of movement changes under visual occlusion.
A number of studies have reported that visual occlusion can
inﬂuence the movement pattern in manual catching (Dessing
et al., 2009; Mazyn et al., 2007; Tijtgat et al., 2011). Mazyn et al.
(2007) asked participants to catch an approaching ball with full
vision and in a visual occlusion condition in which the ball was
occluded at the onset of catching hand-movement. First, partici-
pants performed a block of 10 trials of visually-guided catching.
Then, they were trained in the occlusion condition on blocks of
10 trials until they reached a criterion (catching 7 out of 10 balls),
followed by another block of occluded trials. Number of successful
catches signiﬁcantly dropped in the ﬁrst occlusion block compared
to the full vision block, then improved in the last occlusion block,
but remained worse than with full vision. Of greater interest is
an observed change in the spatial and temporal characteristics of
the catching movement. Compared to the full vision block, the
movement was initiated signiﬁcantly later in the ﬁrst visual occlu-
sion block, and even later in the last occlusion block. Similarly, the
movement time signiﬁcantly decreased and the peak wrist velocity
increased in the ﬁrst occlusion block, and even more so in the last
occlusion block. The peak hand aperture also increased and partic-
ipants caught the ball closer to their bodies in the visual occlusion
condition, compared to the full vision condition. Thus it appears
that participants postponed their response to keep the ball visible
for a longer time, and the movement kinematics compensated for
the late initiation. The peak hand aperture also increased to facili-
tate successful catching in the occlusion condition.
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served to maintain the visibility of the ﬂying target, enabling
participants to detect more information about its motion before
it disappeared. The shorter movement time also produced a shorter
occlusion time before the catch, reducing uncertainty about the
target’s trajectory. Increasing the hand aperture helped to compen-
sate for remaining uncertainty about the ball’s trajectory. These
coordinated changes in the movement pattern suggest that the
visual-motor system adapts to reduced information by seeking to
maximize the period of on-line control, minimize the period of
off-line control, and compensate for uncertainty about the target’s
motion. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis
that on-line control is the preferred mode of action guidance.agent
Fig. 3. Deﬁnition of variables as an agent walks to a stationary goal: heading
direction (U), goal direction (Wg), target-heading angle (bg ¼ UWg), metaphorical
spring stiffness (k) and damping coefﬁcient (b). Adapted from Warren (2006).3. On-line control: is current information sufﬁcient?
Whereas model-based control emphasizes the role of an inter-
nal representation in guiding action, on-line control emphasizes
the role of current visual information. The approach seeks to iden-
tify both the information that is used and the control laws that
map that information into the control variables for action
(Warren, 2006).
3.1. On-line control of locomotor behavior
According to the on-line approach, locomotion is normally con-
trolled on the basis of current visual information, without relying
on an internal representation such as a world model or a pre-
planned path. Under normal circumstances, humans control their
actions by detecting current information and coupling it to move-
ment control variables in real time (with a visual-motor delay),
avoiding the computational demands of maintaining an internal
model and a path plan in a complex environment that is continu-
ously changing.
Much evidence has shown that multisensory information is
used to perceive one’s current direction of travel (heading) and
control steering, including optic ﬂow (Bruggeman, Zosh, &
Warren, 2007; Harris & Carré, 2001; Li & Cheng, 2013; Turano
et al., 2005; Warren et al., 2001), proprioception (Harris & Bonas,
2002; Rushton et al., 1998; Wilkie & Wann, 2003), and vestibular
information (Butler et al., 2010). The steering dynamics theory
developed by Warren and his colleagues (Fajen & Warren, 2003;
Warren & Fajen, 2008) offers an existence proof that on-line con-
trol based on such information is sufﬁcient to account for basic
locomotor behavior, including steering to stationary and moving
targets, and avoiding stationary and moving obstacles (see also
Wilkie & Wann, 2003, 2005). Steering is treated as a nonlinear
dynamical system that takes information about the current head-
ing and the directions and distances of objects as input, and gener-
ates a new heading direction as output, without an internal
representation of the environment or the future path.
Consider the example of steering to a stationary goal. Fajen and
Warren (2003) modeled steering with a second-order differential
equation in which the angular acceleration of turning is a function
of the current difference between the heading direction and the
goal direction (UWg) and the distance of the goal (dg):
€U ¼ b _U kgðUWgÞðec1dg þ c2Þ ð1Þ
This theoretical model can be thought of as an angular mass-
spring system(Fig. 3). Themodel effectivelynulls the target-heading
angle by creating an attractor of heading in the goal direction. The
damping term b _U reﬂects a frictional force that is proportional to
the turning rate, preventing oscillations about the goal. The stiffness
term kgðUWgÞ reﬂects the observation that the strength of
the attractor linearly increases with the target-heading angle. Thestiffness is modulated by goal distance ec1dg þ c2, reﬂecting the
observation that the attractor strength decays exponentially with
distance.
Fajen and Warren (2003) found that this theoretical model
closely reproduces walking trajectories as goal distance and tar-
get-heading angle are varied. Participants turned onto a straight
path to the goal in the early part of a trajectory, and they did so
earlier when the goal was closer and when the target-heading
angle was greater. The model generalizes to new conditions with
ﬁxed parameter values (b, k, c1, c2). Moreover, similar components
for other elementary behaviors have been developed, which can be
linearly combined to account for more complex behavior (Warren
& Fajen, 2008).
Taken together, the steering dynamics theory demonstrates
that on-line control is sufﬁcient to explain basic human locomotor
behavior when concurrent information is available. Of course, it is
also possible to create conditions that invoke off-line control, by
removing environmental information (e.g. blind walking), impos-
ing task demands that render the available information inade-
quate, or introducing a strategic element (e.g. team sports). But it
does not follow that model-based strategies are normally used to
guide locomotion when on-line control is sufﬁcient.
3.2. On-line control of manual actions
It is widely observed that manual action is adjusted based on
incoming visual information even after movement onset (Brenner
& Smeets, 1997; Brenner, Smeets, & de Lussanet, 1998; Caljouw,
van der Kamp, & Savelsbergh, 2006; Diedrichsen et al., 2004;
Gosselin-Kessiby, Messier, & Kalaska, 2008; Sarlegna et al., 2003;
Saunders & Knill, 2004, 2005). Brenner and Smeets (1997) found
that participants rapidly adjust their hand movement to the tar-
get’s perturbed position in a manual hitting task. Participants were
asked to hit a stationary disk with a rod as soon as the disk
appeared on a screen. In some trials, the disk was suddenly dis-
placed to the left or right as participants initiated their hand move-
ment. Hand trajectories indicated that participants shifted their
hand movement toward the disk’s new position about 110 ms after
its displacement. In another study (Brenner, Smeets, & de Lussanet,
1998), participants hit a moving target with a rod; on some trials,
the target velocity suddenly increased or decreased after move-
ment initiation. The results indicated that participants adjusted
their hand movement on-line with a visual-motor delay about
200 ms, responding to the perturbation on the target’s velocity.
Gosselin-Kessiby, Messier, and Kalaska (2008) required partici-
pants to ﬁrst align their hand with the orientation of a target then
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change their hand orientation during reaching, yet the initial align-
ment error was reduced during the reach. This result suggests that
on-line adjustment of hand movements may be carried out invol-
untarily based on the available information.
In the previous section, we found that when manual tasks are
performed under visual occlusion, performance typically deterio-
rates and movement patterns change to compensate for the loss
of visual information (e.g. Mazyn et al., 2007). The results imply
that an internal representation is by itself insufﬁcient to account
for normal levels of performance, inconsistent with model-based
control. Conversely, the present studies indicate that manual
actions are continuously guided by the available information and
are rapidly adjusted in response to new information. The evidence
thus demonstrates that current information is sufﬁcient to account
for the guidance of locomotor and manual actions, consistent with
on-line control.4. Anticipatory control of interceptive action: is an internal
model necessary?
To interact successfully and efﬁciently with a dynamic environ-
ment, action is often anticipatory. In this section, we will examine
whether anticipatory control of interceptive action is based on cur-
rent information, or whether some form of prediction based on an
internal model is necessary. Two anticipatory control strategies
have been proposed for interceptive action: predictive control,
which is model-based, and prospective control, which is informa-
tion-based1 (Lee & Young, 1985; Warren, 2006; Zago et al., 2009).
We note that these terms are used inconsistently in the literature,
so we will deﬁne our usage here.
According to (1) predictive control, an internal world model is
used to predict the future state of the environment based on input
about its current state, and to plan an appropriate action. For
instance, in the outﬁelder problem, the initial position and velocity
of the ball would be input to an internal model of projectile
motion, which would be used to compute the ball’s trajectory, pre-
dict its landing place and time, and plan a running path to the
interception point (Saxberg, 1987). Predictive control is thus a
form of model-based control. In contrast, (2) prospective control
(Lee & Young, 1985) guides anticipatory action based on current
visual information, and is thus a form of on-line control. As pointed
out by Peper et al. (1994), prospective control might be based on
information that either (a) continuously guides action to a goal
state, or (b) speciﬁes the future spatio-temporal location of the
goal state.
In the ﬁrst case of prospective control, movement is guided by
continuous control information that leads the actor to the goal state,
in accordance with a control law (Bootsma & vanWieringen, 1990).
The OAC strategy for catching a ﬂy ball is a good example: optical
acceleration does not specify the ball’s future landing point, but
continuously guides the actor to the right place at the right time.
If the ball goes out of sight, guidance is lost, and action can con-
tinue on the established course but cannot be adaptively adjusted
further. The level of performance thus depends upon the continu-
ous availability of information, and if information is withdrawn,
upon the spatio-temporal demands of the task.
In the second case, movement is guided by current information
that speciﬁes a future spatio-temporal state. Confusingly, this has
sometimes been called ‘‘predictive information’’ (Lee, 1998;
Morice et al., 2010; Peper et al., 1994); we will refer to it as1 A related strategy of strong anticipation has been developed for temporally
coupled movements (Stephen et al., 2008; Stepp & Turvey, 2010), but unfortunately
we do not have space to consider it here.prospective information. For example, under certain conditions,
the relative rate of optical expansion (tau) of an approaching object
speciﬁes its time-to-contact (TTC) – the time that remains before a
future collision (Hecht & Savelsbergh, 2004; Lee, 1976; Pepping &
Grealy, 2007; but see López-Moliner & Keil, 2012; Tresilian,
1999; Wann, 1996). Instead of a future state being predicted by
an internal model, the future state is speciﬁed by current informa-
tion. The actor can thus sample the information in advance to coor-
dinate action with a future goal despite occlusion, according to
some control law. For instance, a prospective variable like tau
can be used to guide subsequent action by parameterizing an
attractor, to which the system relaxes without further input
(Schöner, 1991; Warren, 2006). Note that prospective information
like tau might be sampled discretely to initiate or control subse-
quent movement, or coupled continuously to adapt an unfolding
action (Lee et al., 1983). In sum, prospective control – whether it
is based on continuously coupled or discretely sampled informa-
tion – is a form of information-based on-line control.
The concept of prospective information also offers a bridge to
off-line control strategies such as mappings and heuristics.
Whereas prospective information uniquely speciﬁes a future state
under normal task conditions and supports successful action,
weaker relations between optical variables and future states may
also exist. If speciﬁc information is unavailable, the visual-motor
system can learn to exploit such regularities, which often hold in
restricted contexts (see Michaels et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2001).
A heuristic is the weakest relation, a qualitative rule of thumb that
serves to put action into the ballpark of the task goal. A mapping is
a quantitative correlation between optical variables and action
variables or goal-states that can be used to guide behavior. As an
example, recall López-Moliner et al.’s (2010) observation that,
when tossing a ball back and forth, random occlusion did not affect
catching if the ball was visible at release. The authors conclude that
catching is normally continuously controlled, but can be guided by
the ball’s initial motion if the trajectory is occluded. In this case,
the situational constraints – such as repeated throws at the same
distance with similar release and catch heights – could make
new regularities available: e.g. with a consistent launch speed,
the arrival place and time would be correlated with the release
angle. Thus, catching might be controlled by a learned mapping
from release angle to arrival point, without invoking an internal
model that generates the intervening trajectory.
In the remainder of this section we consider whether an inter-
nal model is necessary to explain anticipatory behavior in cases
of locomotor and manual interception, or whether weaker heuris-
tic and mapping strategies offer a viable alternative. In most cases,
these alternatives have not been explicitly tested, so we suggest
further analyses or tests that may reveal these strategies.
4.1. Locomotor interception
In locomotor interception tasks, the actor travels to intercept a
target that is moving in the horizontal plane. In initial studies, par-
ticipants travelled on a linear path (e.g. a track or a treadmill) and
only controlled their speed. The results were consistent with the
constant bearing (CB) strategy, such that speed was varied to keep
the target in a constant direction in space, leading to successful
interception (Chardenon et al., 2005; Lenoir et al., 1999, 2002).
To study the control of both heading and speed, Fajen and
Warren (2004) asked participants to intercept a moving target by
walking in a virtual environment. Instead of heading toward the
target’s current position, participants led the target, maintaining
it in a constant bearing direction. When tested against other
possible control strategies, the CB strategy best explained the data,
indicating that it is sufﬁcient to account for locomotor interception
(Fajen & Warren, 2007; but see Fajen, 2013).
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prediction might play a role in guiding interception. Participants
used a foot pedal to control their simulated speed on a straight
path, in order to intercept a moving ball displayed on a large
screen. In the ﬁrst experiment, after the target moved for 2.5–
3.25 s, it usually accelerated to new speed sampled from a normal
distribution. Contrary to the CB strategy, participants learned to
accelerate before the target actually changed its speed. In the sec-
ond experiment, participants intercepted a target that moved on a
linear, concave, or convex curvilinear path in the horizontal plane.
On concave trials, participants accelerated early and then deceler-
ated later in the trial, consistent with the CB strategy. But on
convex trials, they also accelerated early as the target approached
– contrary to the CB strategy – so that they did not lose the target
as it turned later in the trial. The authors ﬁt this data with a model
that combined the CB strategy with a short-term prediction of the
target’s future motion (Dt = 0.5–3.5 s), based on a learned internal
model of the convex trajectory. In their theoretical model, travel
speed is adjusted to null change in the bearing angle at that future
time (t + Dt). Diaz et al. thus suggested that an internal model of
the target’s trajectory plays a role in guiding interception, together
with the CB strategy.
However, the spatio-temporal demands of the trajectories in
Diaz, Phillips, and Fajen (2009) were designed so that the CB strat-
egy would often fail, and indeed participants missed the target on
nearly half the trials (45% in the last block of both experiments).
These are precisely the conditions that evoke off-line control strat-
egies. In Experiment 2, participants appeared to use the CB strategy
in conditions when it was likely to succeed (linear and concave
paths), and another strategy when it was insufﬁcient (convex
path). They thus learned to anticipate the target’s later motion by
accelerating more than required by the CB strategy early in these
trials. We suggest that this could be due to a situation-speciﬁc heu-
ristic that depends on current information (but often fails): for
example, rather than keeping the target’s bearing angle constant,
the bearing angle could be increased at a rate that depends on
the target’s initial motion.
In contrast, when it is possible to intercept the target success-
fully (80–90% of trials), behavior is consistent with the CB strategy
(Bastin, Craig, & Montagne, 2006; Morice et al., 2010). Participants
walked on a treadmill in a virtual environment displayed on a
screen to intercept a ball that moved on linear, concave or convex
paths. With the concave path, participants usually accelerated and
then decelerated, whereas with the convex path they decelerated
and then accelerated. People thus seem to prefer the on-line CB
strategy when it is sufﬁcient for the task. However, on half the
trials Morice et al. (2010) marked the target’s entire path with a
colored stripe just below the ball; they also provided 36 training
trials and feedback on successful interception. When the stripe
was visible, participants learned to adjust their walking speed
based on the target’s TTC with the interception point, rather than
the CB strategy. Marking the target’s path during straight walking
speciﬁed the interception point as well as the target’s 3D trajectory
and velocity, providing information about TTC. Although the
authors conclude that control is based on predictive information
for TTC, the data suggest continuous control of walking speed
based on an evolving estimate of TTC, such as a learned mapping.
Either way, an internal model of the target’s trajectory need not
be invoked to explain the results, because the trajectory was visu-
ally speciﬁed.
The work of Diaz, Phillips, and Fajen (2009) and Morice et al.
(2010) implies that the CB strategy is not the only solution for
locomotor interception: human actors are able to adopt different
strategies under different conditions, demonstrating a certain ﬂex-
ibility in visual-motor control. Recall, however, that participants
could only control their speed in these studies, whereas in normallocomotion both speed and heading must be controlled. Research
by Owens and Warren (2010, described in Warren & Fajen, 2008)
asked participants to intercept a target that moved on a circular
path while walking in a virtual environment on the ground plane.
The results indicated that participants usually walked a smoothly
curved trajectory at a preferred speed to intercept the target, con-
sistent with the CB strategy. When the target traveled repeatedly
on the same circular path, some participants learned a heuristic
after 6–10 trials: they took a short-cut across the circle and picked
up the target on at the far side using the CB strategy. The heuristic
was thus used during the early stage of interception when precise
control was not essential, but the CB strategy phased in during the
late stage when the spatio-temporal demands of the task were
high. Yet when the target could move on two different circular
paths, this heuristic was abandoned and participants reverted to
the CB strategy for the entire interception path.
These results indicate that the constant bearing strategy is a
basic, robust strategy for locomotor interception. Although heuris-
tics can be learned under certain conditions, they are approximate,
speciﬁc to those conditions, and unstable. Adopting a heuristic-
then-online strategy in the context of a repeated target trajectory
is a manifestation of the ﬂexibility in human visual-motor control,
yet it did not generalize to a highly similar situation with only two
possible trajectories. Even when an off-line strategy is adopted, it
appears to be a rough heuristic that applies in narrow contexts,
rather than an accurate, generalizable world model.
4.2. Manual interception
Anticipatory manual interception might also be based on cur-
rent visual information or an internal world model. Whereas loco-
motor interception takes place over several seconds and tolerates
larger errors, manual interception often occurs within a second
and demands a great degree of accuracy. Under such spatio-tempo-
ral demands, visual control faces the further difﬁculty of a visuo-
motor delay, the duration required for visual processing and
action initiation (about 200 ms, Nijhawan, 2008) or modulation
of ongoing action (100–200 ms, Bootsma & van Wieringen, 1990).
Indeed, an early motivation for model-based control was the need
to compensate for time delays inherent in sensory feedback by bas-
ing control on a predicted future state. Here we observe that pro-
spective on-line control, or off-line heuristics and mappings, can
serve the same function without invoking internal models.
Numerous studies indicate that online control is sufﬁcient to
account for manual interception of an approaching ball. Peper
et al. (1994) considered two prospective control strategies for
catching a ball on a linear approach path, which illustrate control
by continuous and prospective information, respectively. Accord-
ing to the required velocity model, lateral hand velocity is contin-
uously controlled by information about the current lateral distance
between hand and ball, divided by the ball’s current TTC, which
evolves during the approach (Bootsma et al., 1997; Dessing et al.,
2002, 2005; Montagne et al., 1999). Other evidence appears to
favor a control strategy based on prospective (‘‘predictive’’) infor-
mation, in which the future passing distance of the approaching
ball (in units of ball diameter) is speciﬁed by the ratio between
its lateral optical velocity and its optical expansion; this ratio can
also be used to continuously control lateral hand position
(Arzamarski et al., 2007; Craig et al., 2009; Jacobs & Michaels,
2006; Michaels, Jacobs, & Bongers, 2006).
Note that the second strategy presumes that the ball’s diameter
is known, based on previous experience with the ball. Indeed,
Peper et al. (1994) reported over- and under-estimates of passing
distance with unexpected ball sizes, but not with speciﬁed ball
sizes. A constant like ball diameter does not meet the criterion of
an internal model, but it can provide a context-speciﬁc constraint
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tance. That is, the learned scaling constant that maps the optical
ratio to hand position depends on whether one is playing baseball
or softball. In sum, there is no reason to introduce an internal
model of the ball’s trajectory in order to account for these manual
interception data.
The need for an internal model has been more pointedly raised
in the case of catching a free-falling object, where gravitational
acceleration signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the timing of interception.
Although the tau variable was originally proposed to specify TTC
with an object moving at a constant velocity, Lee et al. (1983)
argued that it could also be used to control timing when hitting
an accelerating object. A ball was dropped from different heights
toward a participant who leapt up to punch it. The results indi-
cated that the timing of leg and arm movements was geared to
the ﬁrst-order estimate of TTC given by tau, which evolved during
the movement. This suggested that prospective information is used
to control interception on-line, even with accelerating objects.
In contrast, Lacquaniti and his colleagues argued that intercep-
tion of a free falling object is predictively controlled based on an
internal model of earth’s gravity (Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989a,
1989b; McIntyre et al., 2001; Senot et al., 2005; Zago et al.,
2004). For example, McIntyre et al. (2001) asked participants to
catch a ball that was projected downward with three initial veloc-
ities from a height 1.6 m above their hand. On Earth, catching
responses and anticipatory peak bicep EMG activity were closely
synchronized with the arrival of the ball regardless of its initial
velocity. But when the task was performed in microgravity (about
0 g) on board the space shuttle, participants still appeared to cor-
rect for Earth’s gravitational acceleration: the peak bicep EMG
occurred earlier before contact, inconsistent with using ﬁrst-order
TTC or the ball’s actual motion. Considering that object accelera-
tion is poorly perceived (Brouwer, Brenner, & Smeets, 2002;
Werkhoven, Snippe, & Toet, 1992), the authors proposed that a
‘‘second-order internal model of gravity’’ including ‘‘knowledge
about the law of motion’’ is used to predict the movement of a
falling object.
Baurès et al. (2007; Hecht, 2001) argued that the results are
actually consistent with a heuristic strategy based on qualitative
knowledge of the effects of gravity (e.g. ‘‘falling objects speed
up’’) to modulate action timing, and do not require an internal
model of gravitational motion. Indeed, the authors (Zago et al.,
2008) subsequently backed away from a strong model-based inter-
pretation, concluding that their ﬁndings were ‘‘indicative of a
rather unsophisticated model of effects of gravity,’’ and stressing
‘‘the notion of implicit, approximate, probabilistic knowledge of
the effects of gravity on object motion, as opposed to the notion
of explicit, precise, analytic knowledge of Newtonian mechanics.’’
Related studies have shown that continuous visual information
is not necessary to intercept an object in free fall (Katsumata &
Russell, 2012; Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989a). Lacquaniti and Maioli
(1989a) reported that participants were able to catch a ball that
was dropped from different heights and was occluded after its
release. But in contrast to the visible condition, they did not pro-
duce consistent anticipatory EMG activity in the occlusion condi-
tion, casting doubt on the internal representation of intervening
states. Moreover, participants could have learned a simple map-
ping from the three drop heights to the three drop durations in
early trials, and used it to control the timing of interception in
the occlusion condition (Baurès et al., 2007). Indeed, in a study of
virtual ball bouncing, Siegler, Bardy, and Warren (2010) found that
participants use the duration of the ball’s ascent to control the
timing of racket motion during the ball’s descent. Consequently,
they immediately adjust racket motion to a covert change in the
gravitational constant, demonstrating that movement is not con-
trolled based on an internal model of Earth’s gravity.Such a temporal mapping strategy could also be used to
intercept fast-moving objects when there is insufﬁcient time to
detect information about the trajectory. In major league baseball,
for example, a fastball takes about 410 ms from release to arrive
at the plate, and passes the batter at speeds approaching
100 mph (44.7 m/s). The batter’s pre-swing usually begins about
200 ms before the ball’s arrival. Thus, the batter must rely on brief
visual information early in the ball’s ﬂight, sometimes prior to
release, to control hitting, rendering continuous control informa-
tion insufﬁcient.
Gray (2002) asked experienced baseball batters to hit a simu-
lated approaching baseball displayed on a screen. The ball was
launched horizontally from constant height (1.8 m) and distance
(18.5 m) and was only affected by the force of gravity. In the ﬁrst
experiment, pitch speed varied randomly over a large range
(28.2–35.8 m/s, ﬂight times 500–650 ms). The temporal accuracy
of hitting was much better than the spatial accuracy. When only
slow and fast pitches (about 31.3 and 38.0 m/s) were presented
in the second experiment, spatial accuracy signiﬁcantly improved
and batters hit signiﬁcantly more balls. If batting were based on
an internal model of each trajectory, there is no reason to expect
such an improvement. Alternatively, it is possible that restricting
the number of trajectories allowed participants to learn a situa-
tion-speciﬁc mapping from the two initial optical motions to two
spatial positions for the swing. By contrast, in the ﬁrst experiment
the variation in initial conditions may have been too great to learn
a mapping in 60 trials. One might expect experienced batters to
already possess such mappings based on their experience with a
wide range of natural conditions, but the simulated conditions
were not natural (e.g. the pitcher was not visible) and different sit-
uation-speciﬁc mappings were available.
In addition, a pitch sequence effect was observed in the second
experiment. For example, performance on a fast pitch was better
when it followed several fast pitches than when it followed several
slow pitches. The authors explained this as an expectancy effect,
but learning a mapping could provide a mechanism for such an
effect. Speciﬁcally, a fast-pitch mapping may be activated and
tuned by a sequence of fast pitches, resulting in better performance
on the next fast pitch. Switching to a slow-pitch mapping would
depend on the ﬁrst couple hundred milliseconds of the next pitch,
incurring a cost in performance that would improve over subse-
quent slow pitches.
Recently, Hayhoe and her colleagues (Diaz, Cooper, & Hayhoe,
2013; Diaz et al., 2013; Hayhoe et al., 2005, 2012; also Land &
McLeod, 2000) have reported anticipatory eye movements in ball
interception tasks. They proposed that an internal model of the
world’s dynamics is constructed and used to predict upcoming
events and plan movements. For example, Diaz et al. (2013) asked
participants to hit a ball with a racquet in a virtual environment,
after it bounced once on the ground. The ball traveled a constant
distance on three sets of parabolic trajectories and then bounced
near a ﬁxed location (about 3.25 m away); the ball’s elasticity
determined the ratio of prebounce to postbounce vertical velocity,
and was changed half-way through the experiment (after 208 tri-
als). Participants usually tracked the ball after it was released,
made a downward saccade about 150–200 ms before the bounce
and maintained that gaze direction until the ball bounced back
up near the line of sight, after which they tracked the ball again
before hitting it. Analysis revealed that, given the ball’s elasticity
and pre-bounce velocity, the ﬁxed gaze direction was close the
ball’s post-bounce trajectory about 170 ms after the bounce. The
authors suggested that participants made predictive saccades
based on an internal model of the ball’s dynamics.
We note, however, that the ball’s post-bounce trajectory
spanned a rather large visual angle, and thus the saccade did not
need to be very accurate or precise to arrive near this trajectory.
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three initial trajectories to three saccade targets for each ball elas-
ticity, to maintain a 170 ms interval. Such a mapping strategy may
be able to account for anticipatory saccades more parsimoniously
than assuming a generative dynamic world model. Potential tests
of this alternative include analyzing the accuracy and precision
actually required for successful and unsuccessful saccades in this
task, and determining whether experience with one set of ball tra-
jectories generalizes to new trajectories or requires learning a new
mapping.
Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that an internal model
of gravity or elasticity is necessary to explain control of manual
interception. In general, interception appears to be controlled on-
line by visual information when it is available. In certain circum-
stances, when information is unavailable (e.g., visual occlusion),
near threshold (e.g. baseball batting), or object trajectories are lim-
ited, context-speciﬁc heuristic or mapping strategies appear be
learned. The advantage of these simple strategies over an accurate
internal model is their parsimony in explaining interception
behavior. However, it is a challenge to empirically distinguish
hybrid on-line and off-line control from a predictive internal model
that is continually updated by current information. To do so,
experiments should be designed to probe the representation of
intervening states expected under predictive control, analyze situ-
ation-speciﬁc correlations that may reveal heuristic and mapping
strategies, and test the domain of generalization they predict.5. Discussion
How is human action ordinarily controlled? We have reviewed
the experimental literature on two general approaches to the con-
trol of action, the on-line approach and the model-based approach.
We close by taking stock of the evidence for each.5.1. Strong model-based control
The model-based approach seeks to account for the control of
action based on an internal world model. In particular, the strong
model-based hypothesis states that vision is used to construct an
internal model of the environment and the actor, and action is con-
trolled exclusively based on this world model, whether or not
visual information is concurrently available. However, the proper-
ties of an internal world model are seldom clearly speciﬁed, mak-
ing the hypothesis difﬁcult to test.
Successful performance in visually directed action such as blind
walking is regarded as an existence proof of an internal world
model. However, it does not follow that such a world model guides
walking when the eyes are open. Indeed, the literature shows that
performance with vision is signiﬁcantly more precise than perfor-
mance without vision, increasingly so as the spatio-temporal
demands of the task increase. Moreover, it is widely reported that
longer occlusion times lead to progressively impaired perfor-
mance. These ﬁndings imply that a world model by itself is not suf-
ﬁcient to guide action, contrary to the strong model-based control
hypothesis. The difﬁculty is that the temporal persistence of a
world model is unspeciﬁed, and thus degraded performance under
occlusion, no matter how rapid, can be attributed to the decay of
an internal model.
A world model is often posited to account for anticipatory
actions as well, for example in locomotor or manual interception
of a moving target. On this view, interceptive actions are predica-
tively controlled, where the prediction is based on an internal
model of the target’s motion or object dynamics. We suggest that
these results may be explained either by prospective on-line
control, or else simpler heuristic or mapping strategies. Generallyspeaking, the existing data are insufﬁcient to justify the strong
model-based control hypothesis in the face of more parsimonious
explanations.
In sum, without clear speciﬁcation, the existence and role of an
internal world model are difﬁcult to operationalize and test empir-
ically. First, the content and scope of the concept are very broad. In
the literature we reviewed, a world model could be a spatial mem-
ory (e.g., Loomis & Beall, 2004), a model of Earth’s gravitational
acceleration (e.g., McIntyre et al., 2001), knowledge of an object’s
dynamic properties (e.g. ball elasticity in Diaz et al., 2013), or a
spatiotemporal model of a speciﬁc trajectory (e.g. a convex path
in Diaz, Phillips, & Fajen, 2009). Second, the expected accuracy
and temporal persistence of an internal world model are unspeci-
ﬁed. Although humans can perform certain tasks under visual
occlusion, longer occlusion usually leads to progressive deteriora-
tion in performance. If model decay is rapid and requires frequent
visual updating, at some point the model-based hypothesis col-
lapses into the on-line control hypothesis, for action is strongly
dependent upon current information. In such cases, we conclude
that on-line control is more parsimonious than model-based
control.
Taken together, the hypothesis of an internal world model as
used in the literature appears to be too ill-speciﬁed to serve as a
useful scientiﬁc hypothesis, subject to operationalization and
empirical test (Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003; Hecht,
2001). Thus, it is no longer sufﬁcient to invoke the concept casu-
ally. It is incumbent upon proponents of model-based control to
formally specify a proposed internal model, operationalize its pre-
dictions, and compare it with alternative hypotheses.
In conclusion, there is little evidence to support the use of
model-based control when visual information is concurrently
available. When visual information is removed, task performance
deteriorates rapidly, implying that an internal world model alone
is not sufﬁcient to guide action. Both approaches thus recognize
that current information is necessary for normal levels of perfor-
mance, given the spatio-temporal demands of the task. Under
these circumstances, positing an internal world model is
gratuitous. Even proponents of the concept (Zago et al., 2008) have
conceded the lack of support for ‘‘precise, analytic knowledge’’ and
accepted ‘‘unsophisticated, approximate knowledge’’ that we
would term heuristic. We conclude that the evidence militates
against the strong model-based hypothesis.
5.2. Strong on-line control
The strong on-line control hypothesis states that action is
controlled on the basis of current visual information, when such
information is available. The literature review demonstrates that
visual information is sufﬁcient to account for on-line control of a
number of locomotor and manual tasks. In addition, performance
tends to be progressively impaired by longer visual occlusion, indi-
cating that current information is necessary for normal levels of
performance. These ﬁndings support the conclusion that human
action is normally controlled by current information, consistent
with the strong on-line control hypothesis.
Whereas an internal model cannot be directly manipulated to
test its inﬂuence on action, the on-line control hypothesis has
the advantage that visual information can be manipulated and
control laws can be tested experimentally. In numerous cases,
informational variables have been mathematically characterized
and control laws formally speciﬁed. A number of studies have
reported evidence supporting the view that particular variables
or control laws are used to guide action in a range of tasks. More
work is required, however, to experimentally test these hypotheses
and ﬁrmly establish proposed control laws, including their level of
generality.
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not a comprehensive account of the control of action, for it does
not attempt to explain behavior under conditions when visual
information is unavailable. For a complete theory, an account of
off-line control is also needed.
5.3. The hybrid hypothesis
The hybrid hypothesis aims to be a comprehensive account of
the control of action by combining strong on-line control with
complementary off-line control strategies. This hypothesis accepts
that action is normally controlled online by current information.
But under exceptional conditions, such as visual occlusion, near
visual threshold, or repeated object motion, action may be con-
trolled by simple off-line strategies such as heuristics, mappings,
or spatial memory. For example, in visually directed locomotion,
an approximate spatial memory of the target location appears to
guide blind walking after vision is removed.
These weak off-line strategies do not guarantee successful or
general control of action. Spatial memory is approximate, capac-
ity-limited, and subject to interference and decay over time. A heu-
ristic is a qualitative rule of thumb without much predictive
accuracy, but gets the actor into the ball-park for the task. A map-
ping strategy is based on a correlation between optical variables
and action variables or goal-states that holds in a limited context.
For example, a simple mapping from three drop heights to three
drop durations may be learned during normal catching, and then
used when the motion is occluded (Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989a).
We ﬁnd that existing evidence does not call for an accurate
world model, and can often be explained by a simple heuristic or
mapping. For example, participants walking to intercept a target
that moved on a ﬁxed circular path learned a short-cut strategy
(Owens & Warren, 2010), but on-line control phased in on the far
side of the circle. Moreover, the strategy was context-speciﬁc and
did not generalize to multiple target paths with different radii
and directions. This has the hallmarks of a heuristic. Baseball bat-
ters operating near the limits of visual performance appeared to
learn a simple mapping from the ball’s two initial motions to
two arrival locations. Such results are more consistent with con-
text-speciﬁc mappings than a general internal model of the projec-
tile motion.
However, consider the possibility that off-line control is based
on a full-blooded internal world model. Despite the vagueness of
the hypothesis, we believe that an internal model can be distin-
guished from these weaker strategies. The original concept of an
internal model entails computing and representing intervening
states of the world with some degree of accuracy. It also implies
that the model is generative, such that model-based control should
generalize to new conditions within the model’s domain. For
instance, an internal model of projectile motion would represent
intervening states of a ball’s trajectory, and may be expected to
generalize to new initial distances, launch speeds and angles, and
ball elasticities, depending on its scope. Intervening positions on
a target’s trajectory can be probed by analyzing adaptive adjust-
ments during occlusion (Zhao &Warren, 2014), or by unexpectedly
revealing the target and analyzing mid-course corrections. Gener-
alization can be tested by training participants on a subset of ball
trajectories and transferring them to new trajectories. Such proper-
ties can thus be empirically evaluated, but testable predictions
depend on specifying the scope and content of the internal model.
Conversely, heuristics and mappings must also be formally
speciﬁed and experimentally tested. We have suggested a number
of these alternative strategies above, some of which could be eval-
uated by reanalysis of existing data. Empirical tests of possible
mappings require analyzing correlations between optical variables
and goal-states that could guide action in a restricted tasksituation, and comparing their predictions with those of an internal
model. The domain of generalization can be investigated by trans-
fer to new situations in which the observed mapping no longer
holds, providing a strong test of both hypotheses. Thus, experi-
ments can be explicitly designed to disentangle the predictions
of a general internal model from situation-speciﬁc heuristics and
mappings.
6. Summary
In this paper, we considered the evidence regarding on-line and
model-based control of action. We ﬁrst introduced three hypothe-
ses: strong on-line control, strong model-based control, and hybrid
control. Second, we reviewed studies that manipulated the avail-
ability of visual information during locomotion and manual actions
such as reaching and catching. The results show that performance
in these tasks deteriorates rapidly with visual occlusion, and that
actors adapt their movement patterns to maintain visual contact
as long as possible. We conclude that an internal world model is
insufﬁcient to control behavior at normal levels of performance,
and performance is strongly dependent on current information.
Positing a short-lived, low-ﬁdelity model that requires continual
updating is a desperate measure that collapses into on-line control.
Third, we considered studies of the visual information that is
used to guide locomotion and manual action, and the control laws
by which information governs behavior. The evidence indicates
that current information is normally sufﬁcient to control action,
without invoking an internal model. We conclude that action is
ordinarily controlled on-line when current visual information is
available.
Finally, we reviewed the literature on anticipatory control in
interceptive actions. Results show that continuous control strate-
gies are general and robust, and that strategies based on prospec-
tive information, in which current visual information speciﬁes a
future spatio-temporal goal state, can also be used for on-line con-
trol. In certain situations – under visual occlusion, near the limits
of visual ability, or with limited trajectories – participants adopt
a simple heuristic or mapping strategy, in which optical variables
are mapped to an action variable or goal state. However, we ﬁnd
little evidence of model-based predictive control, in which an accu-
rate internal model of an object trajectory is used to control inter-
ception. An internal world model is thus not necessary to account
for off-line control.
We thus conclude that the strong model-based hypothesis is
not sustainable. Action is ordinarily controlled on-line when cur-
rent information is available, consistent with the strong on-line
hypothesis. However a comprehensive account must also explain
off-line control when sufﬁcient visual information is unavailable.
We believe that the hybrid hypothesis offers the most promising
approach, combining on-line control under normal conditions with
simple heuristic and mapping strategies in restricted circum-
stances. This hypothesis is comprehensive, parsimonious, and has
the potential to account for a variety of tasks under a wide range
of visual conditions. Further experiments are needed to distinguish
the predictions of well-speciﬁed internal models from situation-
speciﬁc heuristics and mappings, by probing intervening states
and testing their domains of generalization.
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